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Vegans who do not eat roadkill are immoral. Consider
that the most common rationale for veganism is avoiding
unnecessary harm to animals.1 It is a well-known fact that
animals are killed in the cultivation of plant foods such as wheat,
corn and soybeans. Mice, rabbits and other field creatures are
routinely run over by tractors or cut in two by harvesters. To
buy commercial plant food therefore is to sustain the system
responsible for these deaths. Road-killed animals, by contrast,
are already dead, so the decision to consume them does not
perpetuate a lethal process. A diet that consists entirely of
plant food therefore will be responsible for a greater number
of animal fatalities than a mostly-plant diet that also includes
roadkill but no other meat.
So goes the argument of Donald Bruckner’s cheeky paper,
“Strict Vegetarianism is Immoral,” a standout chapter of The
Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. Anyone who follows the
animal ethics literature will be familiar with defences of meat
eating premised on a rejection of animal rights. Bruckner’s
ingenious argument by contrast is premised on animals having
rights. This captures something of the collection in general,
which offers original moves and thought-provoking conclusions
with impressive frequency.
Moral Complexities has three sections. Parts I and II
respectively defend and challenge the ethics of meat-eating.
Part III, New Directions, contains papers that mostly endorse
meat-free diets, but address questions such as whether
1 I take it for granted that readers of Between The Species are familiar
with the central arguments for animal rights and so do not repeat
them here. For an example of such an argument that rules out killing
animals for food, even painlessly, see McMahan (2003). For a more
concise statement of this view see McMahan (2008).
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veganism should be regarded as an aspiration or a lifestyle, or
why vegetarianism often assumes a quasi-religious status for its
practitioners, to their own detriment. The result is a collection
with greater thematic unity than most anthologies that offers a
cutting-edge discussion of central issues.
Defending Meat. None of the papers that defend omnivorism
endorse factory farming. This reflects the current animal ethics
debate, in which pro-factory farming views are increasingly
a minority view. Thus Christopher Belshaw dismisses factory
farming as “indefensible” in his opening defence of meateating (12). Belshaw instead argues that death is not bad for
most animals in any way that matters. His premise is that
in order for death to be bad in a relevant way, the animal in
question must want to continue living, and most animals are
incapable of forming such a desire.
Belshaw does not deny the controversial implications of
this view for human beings incapable of desiring their own
continued existence. “It is not bad, in the relevant sense,
for babies to die.” (14) This is not the only counter-intuitive
implication of Belshaw’s account. If an animal is incapable of
wanting to go on living, he argues, then it is not capable of
looking ahead to a future that contains stretches of good life as
well as suffering, and concluding that the positive experience
will outweigh the bad. Given this, it is better that the animal
die now, so as to avoid the one thing that does matter, suffering.
“Even if there are many years of good life ahead, still it is not
worth an animal’s suffering a day’s agony in order for it to live
that life.” (16) This view opens the door to killing animals for
food insofar as they have no interest in continued existence.
Painlessly killing them will not only be permissible, but in
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many cases a net good for the animals, as it will prevent future
suffering.
J. Baird Callicott defends meat-eating on communitarian
grounds. We are simultaneously members of multiple
communities—“familial, municipal, national, global, mixed,
biotic”—and the obligations they generate can come in conflict
(61). Callicott argues that one such obligation we have is to the
environment or biotic community as such. Strictly speaking,
this includes an obligation to end industrial agriculture, in
order to restore agricultural land to a wild state and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from livestock. So in Callicott’s
ideal world, meat-eating would consist of occasionally
consuming venison or other game. The obligation to bring
this about however is collective, and “at planetary scales, the
impact of one’s personal and voluntary abstinence from meat
is negligible.” (62) Callicott thus invokes a version of the socalled inefficacy objection—our attempts to bring about
systemic change through individual actions are futile—to deny
any personal obligation to dismantle industrial agriculture. So
long as the meat we eat is not factory farmed, our here-andnow obligations to animals will be met.
Callicott allows that veganism may have some symbolic
value, but on his communitarian account, “hewing to one’s
vegan virtue [can occur] at the cost of violating one’s social
duties” (62). Callicott illustrates this with an anecdote about
an academic dinner party at which the hosts, although not
vegan themselves, took the trouble to cook vegan. Two vegan
graduate students however “sat stolidly in front of empty
plates,” explaining that they ate before they came because they
had not known if the dinner would be vegan (61). On Callicott’s
account they were failing to recognize an obligation to accept
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the hospitality of their hosts. “Had it not been inappropriate to
do so, I would like to have insisted that the two elder-insulting
graduate students take my seminar in ethical theory” (62).
Challenging Meat. Callicott’s conclusion is undermined
by three anti-meat papers that follow his, each of which
offers a sustained response to the inefficacy objection. Two
of these papers are nicely done. Mark Budolfson grounds an
obligation to avoid meat in a theory that grants weight to the
degrees of essentiality of harm to an act. Harm or killing are
“highly essential” to the production of meat, so we have an
obligation to avoid it, whether or not our individual shopping
decisions hasten modern agriculture’s demise (96). On an
empirical level Budolfson notes that our individual shopping
decisions can impact the finances of individual restaurants
and supermarkets, surely important elements of the industrial
food system. Clayton Littlejohn examines responses to ethical
veganism that all appeal in one way or another to the idea that
one’s individual actions have no moral significance. One such
“no-difference” argument Littlejohn examines is the inefficacy
objection. Among other failings, he argues, it too quickly
detaches our individual obligations from our collective ones.
If the food system as a whole is to be reformed, then economic
consequences of our shopping decisions are not all that matters.
So does the example we set for others, which can stigmatize
meat-eating and help form a critical mass of plant-eaters that
can effect change. Littlejohn’s essay makes sure-footed moves
through notoriously difficult philosophical terrain, addressing
foundational questions concerning the nature of death, harm
and well-being, and contains a good bibliography on the larger
philosophical debate over the inefficacy objection.
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As nice as Budolfson and Littlejohn’s papers are, the standout
of their section is Julia Driver’s “Individual Consumption and
Moral Complicity.” Driver plausibly suggests that the notion
that we can be complicit in the wrongdoing of others is firmly
lodged in everyday morality. She explores different ways the
concept of complicity might be spelt out, including though the
use of a collective notion of accountability. As she puts it, “if
one is a part of, a participant in, the cause of the bad outcome,
then one is accountable. We don’t just evaluate the actions of
individuals, we also evaluate collective actions, and we can
evaluate the action of an individual as part of a collective.” (71)
On this view someone can be accountable for a wrong even if
her actions play no causal role in bringing it about. Driver gives
the example of a group of people hiding a body. One of them
is physically weak, so that when they all push the corpse into a
river, her effort contributes nothing. Our notion of complicity
should be wide enough to admit that we can be judged for the
wrongs we commit with others, independent of the difference
we make on an individual level.
Driver further presses the case against the inefficacy
objection by noting that it is inconsistent with a rule or policybased approach to ethics. “Even if it is true that a single act on
a single occasion has no causal impact . . . a policy surely does.
The policy itself introduces another reason for a person to act.
Thus, that the policy is a good policy gives me a reason to act
according to the policy.” (74) This is significant insofar as the
inefficacy objection is sometimes framed in consequentialist
terms. Driver shows that rejecting the objection is consistent
with rule-consequentialism. A proponent of the objection
might then retreat to act-consequentialism, but this will be
a big concession. Not only does it confine the relevance of
the objection to act-consequentialists, the proponent of the
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objection must now take on the thankless task of defeating
the many well-known objections to act-consequentialism,
made famous not only by anti-consequentialists such as
Bernard Williams and Samuel Scheffler, but the entire ruleconsequentialist tradition.2
If Driver’s discussion of the inefficacy objection is more
in-depth and probing that Callicott’s, it may reflect their
different argumentative strategies. Driver gives the inefficacy
objection sustained treatment throughout her chapter, whereas
for Callicott it is but one of many subjects (at one point he
describes his position as a “nuanced Humean-DarwinianLeopoldian-Midgelyan biological paradigm of ethics,” the
awkward label name-checking all the sources his essay draws
on). As for the anecdote about the graduate students, its
relevance is unclear. A similar faux pas could be committed by
a follower of any dietary code, whether it be kosher, gluten-free
or Callicott’s own prohibition on factory-farmed meat. In each
case the problem would not be the very fact of having a code, as
Callicott strangely suggests, but failing to communicate with
and be sensitive to the feelings of one’s host.
The remaining anti-meat papers are not centrally concerned
with the inefficacy objection. Ben Bramble discusses it briefly,
but the novelty of his paper is its speculation that meat-eating
can be a cause of unconscious psychological costs, insofar as
it seems to require that we deny any awareness of the moral
wrongs done to food animals. Tristan McPherson investigates
whether omnivores can appeal to a variation of G.E. Moore’s
reply to the skeptic. Moore famously argued that he knew he had
hands, and insofar as skeptical conclusions were incompatible
with this belief, so much the worse for skepticism. Similarly, a
2 Smart and Williams (1973) and Scheffler (1994).
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Moorean omnivore might say that she knows it is not wrong to
drink a glass of milk, and insofar as arguments for veganism are
inconsistent with this belief, so much the worse for veganism.
McPherson argues that the omnivore’s version of the argument
is much weaker than Moore’s. Among other reasons, giving up
the belief that we have hands would require radical revision of
our epistemic paradigms. The changes required by veganism
are comparatively mundane. Appealing to the knowledge that
we have hands thus provides stronger evidentiary support than
appealing to the permissibility of drinking milk.
McPherson’s paper is tightly argued and his conclusion that
Moorean omnivorism has severe problems is convincing. But
no one appears to have ever made such an argument, and its lack
of initial plausibility, for all the reasons McPherson catalogues,
would seem an obvious explanation why. McPherson’s paper
thus comes across as an intellectual exercise rather than a
contribution to the ongoing philosophical debate. In this way it
shares something with Belshaw’s otherwise well-argued paper,
which does not make a sufficient case for its controversial
premise that it is permissible to kill entities incapable of desiring
their own future. This idea and its ramifications for the moral
standing of infants require just as much argumentative support,
if not more, than any claim about meat-eating.
New Directions. Co-authors Lori Gruen and Robert Jones
compare two different understandings of veganism. “Identity
veganism” is a way of keeping one’s hands clean of animal
harm. This view however overlooks that it is currently
impossible to avoid all harm to animals. In an echo of Bruckner,
the authors’ leading example is the death of animals in crop
cultivation. “Aspirational veganism” by contrast embraces
harm-reduction as an ideal, viewing it as “something that one
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works at rather than something one is” (156). Gruen and Jones
see this version of veganism as inseparable from other forms
of ethical consumerism, such as those devoted to “protesting
GMOs [genetically modified organisms], spreading the word
about the devastating impact of palm oil production . . . and
resist[ing] industrial capitalism” (164).
Gruen and Jones offer an interesting discussion of the culture
of modern meat eating, which now includes Mobile Slaughter
Units that travel to small farms to kill animals on site, as well
as the twelve-week “full immersion” butchery program offered
by Fleisher’s Craft Butcher in New York (Tuition: $15,000).
These schemes continue the discretionary killing of animals,
but add a locavore-hipster sheen. Extended to other issues, this
approach would address drone strikes by having the pilots wear
skinny jeans, or help minimum-wage workers by ensuring
indie rock was streaming in their workplace.
Gruen and Jones are surely correct about the drawbacks of
identity veganism. Yet the fact that they do not cite anyone who
defends this self-flattering view makes it seem a straw doll.
They could also say more to defend their oddly exclusionary
view of veganism. I’ve always seen veganism as a rough ethical
equivalent of an overlapping consensus: a practice that people
with many divergent political, religious and philosophical
views can adopt. This view seems more appealing because it
has a more inclusive conception of who can be vegan, while still
allowing debates of issues beyond animal products to continue
unabated. As for the issues Gruen and Jones mention, after
Moral Complexities went to press, 107 Nobel laureates signed
a letter characterizing Greenpeace’s opposition to GMOs as
scientifically misinformed.3 Gruen and Jones’ assumption
3 Achenbach (2016).
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without argument that GMOs should be opposed leaves this
and other briefs for GMOs untouched. Their discussion of
the serious problems caused by palm oil plantations would be
improved by not referring to plantations in “countries such as
Borneo and Sumatra” (157). Borneo and Sumatra are islands.
The former is divided between Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei,
while the latter is part of Indonesia.
Neil Levy offers a fascinating and highly original discussion
of dietary ethics in “Vegetarianism: Toward Ideological
Impurity.” Levy recounts a news story about a Hindu woman
who inadvertently ate a bite of meat on an international flight.
The woman became extremely upset, believing she had violated
a sacred requirement. Levy suggests that he and other secular
vegetarians sometimes experience their own diets in quasisacred terms, insofar as they too would become extremely upset
at eating even a small amount of meat, viewing it as a purity
violation. Levy seeks to replace this view of vegetarianism
(and veganism) with one that is strict but not sacred.
Levy defends strict dietary codes by citing psychological
research on how we apply behavioural rules. The research
suggests that “the extent to which rules must be interpreted
in order to be applied predicts their liability to encourage selfdeception” (180).4 Telling ourselves that we are only going to
eat free-range meat requires us to make ongoing judgement
calls. To take one of Levy’s examples, “should I accept the
waiter’s assurance that the pig was slaughtered humanely?”
(180). The science suggests we have a tendency to succumb to
temptation in answering such questions. A strict no-meat rule
by contrast does a better job managing weakness of will and
requires less cognitive labour.
4 See Ainslie (2001).
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As for sacredness, Levy makes a compelling case that it
can actually undermine a commitment to plant-based eating.
Sacred thinking tends to be all or nothing: hence the Hindu
woman’s belief that one mouthful of meat could undo a
lifetime of vegetarianism. This thinking means that there is
no difference between falling just short of a dietary ideal and
rejecting it outright. Applied to the woman on the airplane, if her
purity really was gone, she might as well have eaten an entire
cow when she landed. But surely we do want to distinguish
between not quite living up to a dietary ideal and completely
abandoning it.
The final two papers, which I cannot do justice to here, are by
Bob Fischer and Alexandria Plakias. In “Against Blaming the
Blameworthy,” Fisher makes the thought-provoking claim that
although eating meat is wrong, the case for actively blaming
meat eaters is weak. The average person can be blamed for many
things, from failing to give enough to charity to supporting
brands that exploit their workers, so we have to decide what
kind of change-inducing blame to prioritize. That involving
an immoral diet is low on the list. In “Beetles, Bicycles, and
Breath Mints: How ‘Omni’ Should Omnivores Be?,” Plakias
offers a thoughtful discussion of how food is distinguished
from non-food, a form of line-drawing over which we have
more autonomy than we generally realize.
What counts as food returns us to Bruckner’s argument for
roadkill. When I taught his piece in a class on philosophy and
the environment several students said it was their favourite
reading. I can see why, given how original and fearless it is.
Bruckner’s claim is not that roadkill is permissible, but that
it is an obligatory staple for vegans. If this is right it will have
ramifications for practically every vegan. But is it right? As with
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Callicott, confidence in Bruckner’s argument is undermined by
other chapters of Moral Complexities.
One reason is suggested by Driver, who asks whether an
ethical vegan could reasonably eat meat other people had
already thrown out. We might think so on the familiar grounds
that such a habit would have no impact on the fate of animals.
Driver suggests that if meat eating is wrong in general, then
it is also wrong for the vegan dumpster diver. “A system is
established whereby some people habitually benefit from the
misdeeds of others, allowing them to reap the benefits without
the dirty hands” (76). Extended to roadside animals, if some
were killed by drivers guilty of negligence (or worse) then
the same problem of “bypassing norms” will also apply to
consumers of roadkill (76): they will benefit from, and so be
complicit in, an immoral practice.
The case for roadkill is also undermined by the rulefollowing problem highlighted by Levy. Whether roadkill was
served by waiters or sold out of the back of trucks, people who
acquired it would inevitably have to decide whether or not the
meat they wanted to eat really was roadkill, risking a demand
for animals deliberately killed for food.
Brucker might mitigate these problems by only requiring
us to eat animals we run over ourselves. This however raises
a separate problem. The rationale for eating roadkill is that it
will cause fewer animal deaths than agriculture. In making this
case Bruckner points out, correctly, that no one really knows
how many animals are killed in crop cultivation. Nevertheless,
he is untroubled by the lack of an accurate figure. Even if the
number of harvester deaths turn out to be small, he figures, it

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 20, Issue 1

145
Andy Lamey

will still be more than the number of deaths caused by eating
roadkill, which must be zero.
But would a norm of eating accidentally killed animals really
not cause any additional deaths? Grounds for doubt came to
mind when my wife and I had to decide whether to drive or fly
on a family trip. We weighed the usual pros and cons of money,
time and screaming kids in the back seat. Bruckner’s scheme
would add a consideration in favour of driving: we might happen
to hit some deer along the way. His proposal thus incentivizes
people to take to the roads in hope of killing animals, thereby
gaining access to the rare delicacy of their flesh. This suggests
that we cannot assume zero additional animal deaths after all.
We rather have two food-production schemes, agricultural and
agriculture plus roadkill, both causing an unknown number of
animal fatalities. This is enough to drain Bruckner’s proposal
of obligatory force.
Yet Bruckner’s proposal remains significant, as it illustrates
how the animal debate is changing. Critics once attacked, even
ridiculed, the very idea of animal rights. Bruckner represents
an increasingly common type of critic who does not challenge
the central argument for animal justice, but rather tinkers with
its implications.5 Bruckner’s proposed diet is itself a form of
veganism, ruling out as it does buying leather or fur and eating
eggs or milk, let alone the vast majority of meat consumption.
Where previous critics once challenged veganism outright,
those of Bruckner’s modern stripe want in on the debate over
the precise form it should take. This may not be everything
vegans hope for, but it is progress beyond doubt.

5 For other examples see Davis (2003) and Archer (2011).
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